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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This is a wrongful death lawsuit filed by the Plaintiffs/Appellants (Phillipses) against
Eastern Idaho Health Services, Inc., dba Eastern Idaho Regional Medical Center dba Behavioral
Health Center at EIRMC (EIRMC), Dr. Matthew Larsen, and Idaho Behavioral Health Services,
LLC dba Eastern Idaho RMC Behavioral Health (IBHS) (collectively Medical Defendants) for
the negligent psychiatric treatment provided to Scott Phillips.
The Medical Defendants filed motions for summary judgment and to strike/exclude the
Phillipses’ expert witness, Dr. Fred Moss, in November 2017. The District Court granted the
motions. The Phillipses unsuccessfully moved for reconsideration. This appeal followed.
B. Course of Proceedings
The Phillipses filed their Complaint and Jury Demand on January 24, 2017. (R., pp. 3649.) The operative amended complaint was filed on August 2nd. (Id., pp. 202-14.) The Medical
Defendants answered in August/September 2017. (Id., pp. 312-24, 343-52.)
On August 10, 2017, the Phillipses moved to compel EIRMC to name a 30(b)(6)
representative to testify about the standard of care. (Id., pp. 279-81.) EIRMC sought a protective
order (id., pp. 215-246, 294-302, 325-32) and the District Court issued one. (Id., pp. 339-41.)
On August 25, 2017, EIRMC and Dr. Larsen noticed the deposition of Dr. Kayne
Kishiyama, a local consulting psychiatrist who spoke with Dr. Moss. (Id., pp. 332-34.) The
Phillipses opposed the deposition and EIRMC filed a motion to compel. (Id., pp. 353-460.) The
District Court allowed the deposition to proceed. (Id., pp. 461-65; 09/21/17 Hr’g Tr. 21:1-44:19.)
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On October 10, 2017, the Medical Defendants noticed Dr. Kathleen Erwin’s deposition.
(Id., pp. 466-68.) Dr. Erwin is a psychiatrist practicing at Portneuf Medical Center’s (PMC)
inpatient facility in Pocatello. Her deposition proceeded under the same terms as Dr.
Kishiyama’s. (Id., pp. 469-71.)
On November 16, 2017, the Medical Defendants moved for summary judgment and to
strike/exclude Dr. Moss. (Id., pp. 518-864.) The Phillipses filed their responses on November 30,
2017. (Id., pp. 1094-210, 1221-842.) The Medical Defendants moved to strike Dr. Moss’s
Declaration filed in opposition to the summary judgment motions. (Id., pp. 1843-2070.) The
District Court heard argument on the pending motions on December 21, 2017. (Id., pp. 2200-03.)
The District Court allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefing on a specific issue that
arose during argument. Those briefs were submitted on December 27, 2017. (Id., pp. 2186-99.)
On January 24, 2018, the District Court granted the Medical Defendants’ motions and
entered a Judgment of dismissal the next day. (Id., pp. 2420-500.)
The Phillipses filed a Combined Motion for Reconsideration and to Alter, Amend, or
Vacate the Judgment on February 7, 2018. (Id., pp. 2590-693.) The Medical Defendants opposed
the combined motion on February 22, 2018. (Id., pp. 2750-811, 2826-53.)
The Phillipses filed their Notice of Appeal on March 5, 2018. (Id., pp. 2981-94.)
The District Court denied the Phillipses’ motion on April 3, 2018. (Am. Supp. R., pp.
187-235.) The Phillipses filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on April 4, 2018. (R., pp. 3005-19.)
The District Court entered an Amended Judgment on May 3, 2018. (Id., 3024-26.)
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C. Statement of Facts
In December 2015, Scott Phillips committed suicide at a hotel in Idaho Falls. Scott’s
widow, Penny, and his two children, Hunter and Halle, survived him.
Late on December 7, 2015, Bingham County Sheriff’s Deputy Jordyn Nebeker patrolled
an area just outside of Blackfoot, Idaho. (Id., pp. 1433-49.) Deputy Nebeker was looking for a
car reportedly driven by an impaired driver. He spotted a car and pulled it over. (Id., p. 1427.)
Scott was the car’s driver. Scott’s behavior during the stop raised Deputy Nebeker’s
concerns. (Id., pp. 1427-28.) Deputy Nebeker ran Scott through field sobriety tests, Scott failed
those tests, and Deputy Nebeker placed Scott in the back of his squad car. (Id., pp. 1427-28.) By
this time Deputy Lawrence Henrie had arrived at the scene.
The deputies searched Scott’s car and found gin and a loaded gun on a seat. (Id., pp.
1426-28.) Scott confessed that he was driving around looking for geese and that he intended to
kill himself that night. (Id., p. 591.) Deputy Nebeker arrested Scott for suspicion of DUI and took
Scott to the jail. (Id., p. 1433-49.) Deputy Nebeker believed Scott intended to commit suicide or
to force Deputy Nebeker to “kill him” and he did not know “why he didn’t.” (Id., p. 1427.)
Deputy Nebeker had an obligation to have a subject like Scott evaluated by a mental
health professional. (Id., p. 1414.) Deputy Nebeker took Scott to EIRMC to be seen by a
Designated Examiner. (Id.) He believed Scott to be an imminent danger to himself and that it
was foreseeable that Scott would have ended his life barring his intervention. (Id., p. 1416.)
EIRMC is located in Idaho Falls and it operates the city’s only acute, inpatient
psychiatric facility: Behavioral Health Center at EIRMC (BHC). (Id., p. 1481.) Audrey Copeland
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PA-C saw Scott at the EIRMC ER and decided that a behavioral health evaluator should see him.
(Id., p. 1375.) She ordered labs and the results showed Scott’s blood alcohol level was .263. (Id.)
Quinn Thibodeau, a licensed counselor, evaluated Scott. EIRMC employed him and he
was EIRMC’s intake coordinator on call for safety evaluations. (Id., pp. 1638-40.) Mr.
Thibodeau spoke with Deputy Nebeker about Scott’s situation. Deputy Nebeker attempted to
comprehensively describe the situation. (Id., pp. 1429-30, Dep. 200:12-201:1.) Mr. Thibodeau
performed a standard behavioral health evaluation on Scott in the ER and then called Dr. Craig
Denny, the on-call psychiatrist, to discuss admission to BHC. (Id., p. 1640.)
Dr. Denny admitted Scott Phillips to BHC “for [his] own safety.” (Id., pp. 1525-26, Dep.
24:9-25.) Mr. Thibodeau believed that Scott constituted a danger to himself and that Scott met
the criteria for admission to BHC. (Id., p. 1525, Dep. 23:12-24:1.) Mr. Thibodeau filled out two
forms with respect to Scott’s mental condition: a Depressive Symptom Inventory and a General
Symptom Inventory prior to Scott’s transfer and admission to BHC. (Id., pp. 1644-45.)
At ~0325 on December 8, 2015, Scott arrived at BHC. (Id., pp. 1531-48.) Scott
acknowledged wanting to end his life earlier that night and that the gun Deputy Nebeker found
was intended for that purpose. (Id.) Scott was sent to bed at ~0410. (Id.)
Scott’s record contains a statement of EIRMC’s “Standard of Care”. (Id., p. 1537.) Dr.
Denny confirmed that the Standard of Care statement applied to him, a psychiatrist, taking only a
single exception to the statement. (Id., pp. 1527-28, Dep. 39:24-43:4.)
Dr. Matthew Larsen was assigned as Scott’s doctor. According to Dr. Larsen, he saw
Scott at ~0900 on December 8th. (Id., p. 1581, Dep. 222:21-23; p. 1597.) Dr. Larsen had access
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to Mr. Thibodeau’s documents and all ER records. (Id., pp. 1575-76, Dep. 189:1-193:4; p. 1579,
Dep. 216:15-23.) He had a duty to review all “pertinent” information for patient treatment. (Id.)
Dr. Larsen acknowledged that the standard of healthcare practice for psychiatrists in
Idaho Falls during December 2015 involved a full and complete psychiatric evaluation. (Id., p.
1577, Dep. 203:24-204:22.) The standard of practice to determine whether Scott constituted a
danger to himself or others, or whether Scott had a grave disability required him to “interview
[Scott] and ask questions that would determine by the legal statute, is he an immediate danger to
himself, to someone else, or to be gravely disabled.” (Id., p. 1578, Dep. 206:15-25.)
Dr. Larsen acknowledged that Scott’s history containted several extant risk factors for
being a danger to himself or others. Those risk factors included: history of bipolar disorder, not
taking medications for two weeks prior to December 8th, steady drinking for the two weeks prior
to December 8th, and Scott’s verbalized suicidal ideation. (Id., Dep. 207:1-21.) Dr. Larsen could
not recall learning that Scott had pointed the gun at himself (id., p. 1446) but he acknowledged
that such behavior would have been a risk factor. (Id., Dep. 208:14-19.) These risk factors bore
on whether Scott should have been involuntarily held at BHC. (Id., Dep. 208:9-19.)
Dr. Denny testified that he was a member of the American Psychiatric Association
(APA). (Id., p. 1523, Dep. 16:17-20.) He testified that the APA publishes resources, treatises,
and guidelines that he used in his practice. (Id., pp. 1523-24, Dep. 16:24-17:17.) Dr. Denny
described the APA’s Guidelines as “basic principles and guidelines and paradigms for care of
patients.” (Id., p. 1524, Dep.17:3-17.) Dr. Denny testified that APA Guidelines he was familiar
with included the Guidelines for the Psychiatric Evaluation of Adults, Third Edition; Guidelines
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for the Treatment of Patients with Bipolar Disorder, Second Edition; and Guidelines for the
Assessment and Treatment of Patients with Suicidal Behaviors. (See id., Dep. 17:20-18:7.) He
testified that the standard of healthcare practice for psychiatrists at BHC in December 2015
followed the APA Guidelines. (Id., pp. 1528-29, Dep. 44:4-47:16.) Dr. Denny agreed he
followed the APA Guidelines and that Dr. Larsen and BHC staff followed them too. (Id.)
When Dr. Larsen was hired to provide psychiatric services at BHC he had completed
residency and was “board eligible.” (Id., p. 1566, Dep. 87:9-16.) Board eligibility means that the
physician had completed a residency or fellowship in a medical specialty. (Id., Dep. 87:21-88:3.)
Dr. Larsen’s training “was sufficient to take” and to pass the board exam. (Id., Dep. 88:15-23.)
Dr. Larsen acknowledged that there is both a level of training and a level of knowledge
necessary to pass boards. (Id., Dep. 91:13-18.) While preparing for the exam Dr. Larsen
encountered no previously unfamiliar medical principles. (Id., Dep. 92:21-25.) Dr. Larsen
confirmed that when he took the exam administered by the American Board of Psychiatry and
Neurology (ABPN) that it was consistent with the standards of healthcare practice he had been
exposed to since starting at BHC in August 2015. (Id., p. 1568, Dep. 96:5-14.) Dr. Larsen
admitted the standards for psychiatric evaluations are the same regardless of board certification.
(Id., p. 1586, Dep. 251:5-21.) Dr. Larsen passed boards in September 2016. (Id., p. 1567.)
On December 8, 2015, Scott asked to leave BHC. He had been admitted as a voluntary
patient rather than involuntary pursuant to Idaho Code § 66-326. When Scott asked to leave
BHC, Dr. Larsen still believed that Scott required further treatment because he “didn’t feel he
had a good safety net to stay safe outside the hospital . . . he wasn’t allowing us to do what we do
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for discharge. I wanted him to stay another night, let us call his family, let us set up discharge,
arrange detox, long-term treatment, and he wouldn’t allow it.” (Id., p. 1584, Dep. 239:11-240:8.)
Rather than trying to stop Scott, delay him, or hold him in any meaningful way, the BHC nurses
escorted Scott to the lobby and just “went back to work.” (Id., p. 1585, Dep. 241:1-11.) Dr.
Larsen made no effort to see Scott before he left even though his office was just down the hall.
(Id., p. 1573, Dep. 184:10-25; p. 1574, 185:1-14; p. 1585, Dep. 241:17-23, Dep. 243:24-244:4.)
“Nothing prevented” Dr. Larsen from seeing Scott prior to his departure other than he was
“leaving at the moment.” (Id., p. 1573, Dep. 184:21-25.) Yet, Scott could not leave BHC without
being buzzed out. (Id.) Dr. Larsen simply did not try.
Scott left BHC at ~1240 on December 8, 2015, less than ten hours after arrival, with no
ride, no coat, and no wallet. (Id., p. 1584, Dep. 240:12-17.) Scott made his way to the Idaho Falls
Marriott Residence Inn. He checked into the hotel at ~1651 on December 8, 2015. (Id., p. 1655,
Dep. 20:8-20, p. 1662.) On December 10th, the hotel staff arrived at Scott’s room, knocked on
the door, removed the security latch, and found Scott’s body. (Id., p. 1659.)
Fred R. Moss, MD, the Phillipses’ expert psychiatrist, is ABPN board certified with over
thirty years of experience in a variety of treatment environments. (Id., pp. 1601-10.) His
experience is outlined in his CV. (Id., p. 1220-312.) Dr. Moss has experience treating individuals
with mental illness including depression, bipolar, and suicidal ideation. (Id., ¶ 7.)
Dr. Moss consulted with two Idaho-based psychiatrists about the standard of healthcare
practice: Kayne Kishiyama and Kathleen Erwin. (Id., pp. 1220-312, 1601-10.) The doctors
discussed standards of healthcare practice relating to the diagnosis, treatment, and care Scott
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Phillips should have received at BHC and from Dr. Larsen. (Id.) They also discussed involuntary
holds in Idaho. (Id.) In addition to the medical records and APA Guidelines, Dr. Moss also
reviewed several deposition transcripts to form his opinions. (Id., pp. 1809-10.)
Dr. Moss reviewed sufficient documentation to opine that in 2015, EIRMC ordinarily
served Idaho Falls, Ammon, and Pocatello. (Id., p. 1221.) Dr. Moss’s opinion was based on
information from EIRMC’s website and the testimony of Shawn LaPray, one of EIRMC’s
30(b)(6) representatives. Dr. Moss looked at Zip Code information for EIRMC’s patients in 2015
and 2016. (Id.) The data establishes that EIRMC saw ~1000 patients from Pocatello in 2015 and
~1100 patients in 2016. (Id., p. 1221.)
Dr. Moss also reviewed Dr. Larsen’s edits of his March 2017 Declaration. (Id., p. 1222.)
Dr. Moss looked at all of Dr. Larsen’s deposition testimony about the standard of healthcare
practice. (Id.) He also looked at Idaho’s Hospitalizaton of Mentally Ill statutes and familiarized
himself with the standards for involuntary, protective holds. (Id.)
Idaho Code § 66-326 uses the term “imminent danger” and it has no specialized medical
meaning beyond what is normally understood. (Id., pp. 1223, 2492-93.) It means immediate or
present danger. (Id.) Dr. Moss and Dr. Larsen understood the phrase the same. (Id.)
Dr. Moss also reviewed census data from 2010 for both Idaho Falls and Pocatello. (Id.)
He reviewed website information for Pocatello’s Portneuf Medical Center and EIRMC. (Id.)
Both facilities have inpatient psychiatric facilities, staffed by board certified psychiatrists. (Id.)
Dr. Moss opined that the two communities were similar. (Id.; see also pp. 1253-312.)
Dr. Moss concluded that the standard of healthcare practice for psychiatrists in Pocatello
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during December 2015 on an outpatient and inpatient basis did not deviate from national
standards practice encompassed by APA Guidelines and the training, skill, and knowledge
embodied by being ABPN certified. (Id., p. 1223.)
Dr. Moss determined that the standards of practice for psychiatrists irrespective of
whether on an inpatient or outpatient basis in Idaho Falls during December 2015 did not deviate
from national standards encompassed by APA Guidelines and the training, skill, and knowledge
embodied by ABPN certification. (Id., p. 1227.) Dr. Moss testified that the Medical Defendants
violated the applicable standard of practice and caused Scott’s death. (Id., pp. 1220-312.)
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Whether the District Court erred in striking Dr. Fred Moss as an expert witness
and also in striking his Declarations;
B. Whether the District Court erred in granting summary judgment to the Medical
Defendants;
C. Whether the District Court erred in allowing the depositions of the Phillipses
local consulting physicians; and
D. Whether the District Court erred in granting the Medical Defendants’ Motion
for a Protective Order concerning the scope of EIRMC’s 30(b)(6) deposition.
III. ARGUMENT
A. The District Court erred when it struck Dr. Moss and his Declarations.
1. Standard of Review
The District Court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See
Samples v. Hanson, 161 Idaho 179, 182, 384 P.3d 943, 946 (2016). An appellate court considers
the following to determine if an abuse of discretion occurred: (1) whether the lower court
correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the

Appellant Brief 9

boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific
choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Selkirk
Seed Co. v. Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 104-05, 996 P.2d 798, 804-05 (2000) (citation omitted).
2. Argument
The Phillipses took a multifaceted approach to Dr. Moss’s foundation. He reviewed
medical records, APA Guidelines, deposition transcripts, and consulted Drs. Kishiyama and
Erwin. Such efforts were inadequate for the District Court and it erred when it struck Dr. Moss.
Each of these sources of information, standing alone, satisfied § 6-1013’s requirements. When
viewed as a whole, Dr. Moss overwhelmingly met the admissibility standard under § 6-1013.
The District Court erred and should be reversed.
Idaho Code § 6-1012 requires that plaintiffs present testimony of negligence with expert
testimony. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1012 (2017). Idaho Code § 6-1013 requires experts to have
actual knowledge of the community standard of healthcare practice to testify. Id. § 6-1013
(2017). A district court’s analysis of expert testimony in medical malpractice cases should be
undergirded by “common sense.” Mattox v. Life Care Ctrs. of Am., 157 Idaho 468, 474, 337 P.3d
627, 633 (2014). A common sense approach eschews hyper-technical interpretations of
testimony. Wickel v. Chamberlain, 159 Idaho 532, 538, 363 P.3d 854, 860 (2015). A district
court should decide the issue based on whether the facts alleged “likely give rise to knowledge of
[the] standard.” Mattox, 157 Idaho at 474, 337 P.3d at 633. There is no magic language required,
Samples, 161 Idaho at 183, 384 P.3d at 947, and the evidence presented should be considered as
a whole. Garriott v. W. Med. Assocs., PLLC, 2017 WL 3288596, at *9 (D. Idaho Aug. 2, 2017).
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a. National standards
The District Court ruled that national standards did not apply. This Court has previously
held that national standards of healthcare may replace local standards. Hoover v. Hunter, 150
Idaho 658, 662, 249 P.3d 851, 855 (2011). An expert determines this based on the information he
reviewed. Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 116, 254 P.3d 11, 17 (2011). In Mattox, the
Court wrote about how standards of care are “sensitive to evolving changes in the way health
care services are delivered” within the State and how “governmental regulations, development of
regional and national provider organizations” among other things provide “various avenues” for
plaintiffs to establish a standard of care. Mattox, 157 Idaho at 474, 337 P.3d at 633. Thus, the
Phillipses assert that national standards are not an all or nothing proposition when it comes to
standards of practice; instead, they can provide key information about the applicable standards.
Dr. Larsen was not board certified by the ABPN in December 2015; however, he was
board eligible and EIRMC/BHC expected all of its physicians to be board certified. (R. pp. 1697720; 1744-46.) The District Court ruled that Dr. Larsen’s training was commensurate to become
board certified. (R., p. 2484.) Dr. Larsen also testified that he encountered no new medical
principles while he studied for his board exam. (See id., p. 1567, Dep. 92:21-25.) Indeed, Dr.
Larsen testified that nothing in the September 2016 board exam conflicted with the standards of
healthcare practice that he had been exposed to since starting work at BHC in August 2015. (Id.,
p. 1568, Dep. 96:5-14.) This last fact is significant because it demonstrates that it was the Idaho
Falls standard of practice in December 2015.
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Thus, even though Dr. Larsen lacked the ABPN certification when he saw Scott, his
education, training, knowledge, and skill were such that he should be measured by the board
certified standards. He eventually acquired the ABPN certification in September 2016, affirming
his testimony that he felt qualified to be board certified in December 2015. He encountered no
novel medical principles while studying for the exam, and nothing on the exam conflicted with
the standards of practice he had been exposed to since starting work at BHC.
The Samples court focused on the effects that a defendant’s training, skill, expertise, and
knowledge had on the applicable standard of healthcare practice. In Samples, the Court ruled that
a physician who was not board certified should be judged by the standards of board certification
because he possessed the “rigorous training” associated with becoming board certified. Samples,
161 Idaho at 184, 384 P.3d at 948. The fact that Dr. Larsen subsequently obtained ABPN board
certification in 2016, while not encountering a single medical principle he was previously
unfamiliar with, suggests that he too should be held to the national standards of board
certification. Dr. Moss, as an ABPN board certified psychiatrist, had foundation to testify about
Dr. Larsen’s violations of those standards. (R., pp. 1220-1312.)
Additionally, BHC and IBHS required their psychiatrists to attain ABPN board
certification. This requirement creates a de facto national standard for all physicians treating
patients at the BHC facility. This is because Idaho Code § 6-1012 measures the standard of
healthcare practice based on a community standard and not based on individual practitioners.
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1012. If the hospital serving the community requires its practitioners to be
board certified, then the community’s standard is the board certification standard. Consequently,
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the licensed general hospital where the healthcare was to be provided, in this case EIRMC’s
BHC, plays an important role in determining the standard of healthcare practice. The standard is
the board certification standard. (R., pp. 1697-720; 1744-46.) Dr. Moss was qualified and had
foundation pursuant to § 6-1013. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1013.
Standards of care should be consistent across disciplines. Patients should be entitled to a
expect a certain level of care from a facility like BHC. Here, BHC is the sole in-patient, acute
psychiatric facility in Idaho Falls. Some of the BHC psychiatrists were board certified in
December 2015. BHC expects its psychiatrists to become board certified. (R., pp.1697-720;
1744-46.) Thus, the standard cannot be physician specific when a hospital imposes certain
standards of qualification on its physicians; otherwise the standard of healthcare practice, as used
in the statute, becomes meaningless. Just because Dr. Larsen lacked ABPN certification at the
time of treatment should not allow him to benefit from a lower standard than his board certified
co-workers. Such an approach only creates illusory and false standards.
b. The APA Guidelines
A common sense reading of Dr. Denny’s deposition establishes that BHC psychiatrists,
including Dr. Larsen, were held to the APA Guidelines as standards of healthcare practice.
Deposition testimony may be relied upon to become familiar with standards of healthcare
practice. In Suhadolnik, the court cited Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 828 P.2d 854 (1992),
and wrote “the plaintiff’s expert reviewed the defendant’s deposition testimony, wherein the
defendant stated that the local standard was equivalent to the national standard and governed by
a particular handbook.” Suhadolnik, 151 Idaho at 117, 254 P.3d at 18.
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Here, the APA publishes guidelines for psychiatry. Dr. Denny, the physician who
admitted Scott to BHC, conceded he followed the APA Guidelines as the standard of healthcare
practice in December 2015. (Am. Supp. R., pp. 53-107.) He also admitted that he was familiar
with the standard of healthcare practice for psychiatrists in the community (Idaho Falls) for the
relevant time period (2015). (Id., p. 96, Dep. 45:12-15.) Dr. Denny testified based on his
experience, even taking into consideration the fact that he could not “direct and control” the
actions of others, that he followed the APA Guidelines and that BHC’s staff, including Dr.
Larsen, followed those standards. (Id., Dep. 46:6-19; 47:13-16.) The APA Guidelines were
discussed during Dr. Denny’s deposition both generally and specifically. (Id., p. 92, Dep. 17:317; 17:21-18:18.)1 Dr. Denny’s testimony, under Suhadolnik, sufficiently informed Dr. Moss
about the standards of practice. His testimony echoed the testimony from Kozlowski, where the
defendant gave generalized testimony that a handbook governed the standard of healthcare
practice. Kozlowski, 121 Idaho at 829, 828 P.2d at 858. Thus, the District Court erred.
The District Court abused its discretion by creating a requirement that Dr. Denny know
the standards of practice for all other psychiatrists. No law requires such a showing, and it would
be an absurd requirement that no plaintiff or expert could ever satisfy. The District Court
observed that Dr. Larsen disagreed with Dr. Denny’s statement about the APA Guidelines. The
District Court relied on that disagreement to rule against the Phillipses. (Id. pp. 2487-88.) The
District Court appears to require universal agreement among practitioners as to the standards. Dr.
1

The Phillipses discussed specific guidelines with Dr. Denny (Am. Supp. R., p. 96, Dep. 45:20-

23) and other guidelines were identified in the disclosures. (See, generally R., pp. 1779-1810.)
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Larsen’s disagreement with Dr. Denny’s testimony does not vitiate its value to Dr. Moss. The
law does not limit admissible testimony pursuant to § 6-1013 to that based on universally agreed
upon information. It should not have mattered that Drs. Denny and Larsen differed; Dr. Moss
could have relied on their respective testimony independently or as a whole. Dr. Moss’s reliance
on Dr. Denny’s testimony in his Declaration satisfactorialy presented evidence that would “likely
give rise to knowledge of [the] standard.” Mattox, 157 Idaho at 474, 337 P.3d at 633.
c. Dr. Kishiyama familiarized Dr. Moss with the standards
The District Court relied on a false distinction created by the Medical Defendants. The
Medical Defendant’s distinction of inpatient vs. outpatient is illusory because there is no
difference when it comes to whether a patient should be involuntarily admitted or held at a
facility. Even if there were differences, they were only of a small degree, as noted by Dr. Larsen.
The District Court erred with respect to Dr. Kishiyama because he is a member of the
same medical speciality as Dr. Larsen and he practiced in Idaho Falls in December 2015. He
satisfies Dulaney’s requirements of time, place, and speciality. (See R., pp. 1601-10.) The fact
that Dr. Kishiyama did not have an inpatient practice at BHC does not matter because Idaho
Code § 66-326 applies broadly to involuntary holds. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-326 (2017).
This is the statute Dr. Larsen would have relied upon to place an involuntary hold on Scott and it
does not refer to outpatient vs. inpatient. The information available to the District Court
established that Dr. Kishiyama actively saw patients with the same psychiatric conditions
suffered by Scott in December 2015. (R., pp. 1601-10; 1619-34.) Drs. Moss and Kishiyama
discussed, at length, the fundamental aspects of the standards of healthcare practice for treating
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those psychiatric conditions and also the standards for involuntary holds. (Id.) Since Dr. Moss
discussed these standards with Dr. Kishiyama, his declaration “likely gives rise” to knowledge of
the standard and should have been admissible. See Mattox, 157 Idaho at 474, 337 P.3d at 633.
Moreover, the information provided by Dr. Kishiyama should not be viewed in a vacuum.
It has to be placed in the context of the information contained in Dr. Larsen’s deposition, Dr.
Denny’s deposition, the medical records, APA Guidelines, the EIRMC Standard of Care
statement, and other information about the standards of healthcare practice. The law does not
require that an expert rely on a single source of information for all of his foundation under § 61012. Instead, everything should be looked at as a whole. Garriott, 2017 WL 3288596, at *9. Dr.
Kishiyama understood the involuntary hold process even though he did not have an inpatient
practice. (See R., pp. 1605-07.) When placed in the context of all the information Dr. Moss relied
upon, he had foundation under § 6-1013.
Dr. Moss also looked to Dr. Larsen’s testimony. This Court held that a medical
defendant’s description of the standard can be sufficient. See Perry v. Magic Valley Reg’l Med.
Ctr., 134 Idaho 46, 51, 995 P.2d 816, 821 (2000); Suhadolnik, 151 Idaho at 118, 254 P.3d at 19.
In Garriott, Judge Dale noted that deposition testimony “need not contain a scripted question and
answer to establish the local standard of care.” Garriott, 2017 WL 3288596, at *9. Experts can
rely on testimony as a whole. Id.
Dr. Larsen reviewed Dr. Moss’s March 2017 Declaration during his deposition. (R., pp.
1582-83; 1601-10.) In its January 2018 decision, the District Court failed to consider Dr.
Larsen’s discussion. (03/01/18 Hr’g Tr. 254:16-255:22; 306:4-11.) On reconsideration, the Court
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minimized the effects of Dr. Larsen’s testimony, saying that Dr. Larsen only voiced
disagreements with Dr. Moss rather than stating a standard of care. (Am. Supp. R., p. 209.)
There are instances when Dr. Larsen says what is not the standard of practice, disagreeing
with Dr. Moss. (R., pp. 1582-83; 1601-10.) He made other affirmative corrections to the
Declaration and also agreed with much of what was contained in the document. (Id.) The central
question Dr. Larsen answered was how he disagreed with the standard of care set forth by Dr.
Moss. (Id.) Dr. Larsen did so and talked about the nature of the disagreements. (Id.) Dr. Moss
could then consider those disagreements in the overall context of the information he learned from
Dr. Kishiyama and his own training. Dr. Larsen testified about what constituted a standard
psychiatric evaluation under the standard of care. (Id., p. 1577, Dep. 204:8-22; p. 1581, Dep.
221:2-11; pp. 1597-600.) He described Scott’s evaluation. (Id., p. 2652, Dep. 144:18-148:17.)
Dr. Moss reviewed that testimony and more. (Id., pp. 1220-312.) Dr. Moss appropriately drew on
several sources to understand the standard of healthcare practice. See Garriott, 2017 WL
3288596, at *9. His discussion with Dr. Kishiyama in particular should have been enough to
meet § 6-1013’s requirements. The District Court, therefore, abused its discretion.
d. Dr. Erwin, Pocatello, and similar Idaho communities
The District Court found that Dr. Moss’s conversation with Dr. Kathleen Erwin
insufficient to familiarize Dr. Moss by ruling that Pocatello and Idaho Falls are not part of the
same community. (Id., pp. 2429-37; 2491-92.) On reconsideration, the Court reaffirmed its prior
ruling but also refused to consider the Phillipses’ arguments that the standard of healthcare
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practice in Idaho Falls was indeterminable and that Pocatello was a similar Idaho community.
(Am. Supp. R., pp. 219-20.) The District Court abused its discretion.
The District Court incorrectly ruled that indeterminability was not raised in opposition to
the summary judgment/motion to exclude.2 (Id.) Yet, a comprehensive review of law and fact is
a virtue of a reconsideration motion. Coeur d’Alene Mining Co. v. First Nat. Bank of N. Idaho,
118 Idaho 812, 823, 800 P.2d 1026, 1037 (1990)(quoting J.I. Case Co. v. McDonald, 76 Idaho
223, 229, 280 P.2d 1070, 1073 (1955)). In Johnson v. North Idaho College, 153 Idaho 58, 278
P.3d 928 (2012), the Court wrote, “A motion for reconsideration is a motion which allows the
court—when new law is applied to previously presented facts, when new facts are applied to
previously presented law, or any combination thereof—to reconsider the correctness of an
interlocutory order.” Id., at 62, 278 P.3d at 932.
If a motion is timely, parties should be able to make new legal arguments, apply new
authority to the facts, and present new evidence to a district court. The District Court erroneously
refused to consider arguments on indeterminability and community similarities.
The Phillipses presented evidence and argument that the Idaho Falls standard of practice
was indeterminable and that Pocatello is a similar community. (R., pp. 2613-19.) The arguments
are incorporated by reference even though the District Court never considered them. The essence
of the argument is that BHC was the sole, acute inpatient facility in Idaho Falls (Id.; Am. Supp.
R., pp. 104-07, Dep. 12:18-21.) Based on Hoene v. Barnes, 121 Idaho 752, 828 P.2d 315 (1992),
2

No motion was filed but the issue was discussed at length during oral argument based on

statements made by counsel for the Medical Defendants. (12/21/17 Hr’g Tr. 74:1-103:25.)
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the standard was indeterminable. Dr. Moss reviewed demographic and medical services
information for the two communities and opined they were similar. (R., pp. 1220-312.)
The District Court also erred when it ruled that Pocatello and Idaho Falls are not part of
the same community. The determination of whether a city is within a geographic area ordinarily
served by a hospital is a factual issue. Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 35, 156 P.3d 533, 536
(2007). In Bybee v. Gorman, 157 Idaho 169, 335 P.3d 14 (2014), the Court ruled that even
though this is a factual issue, district courts should make an admissibility determination pursuant
to Rule 104. Id., 157 Idaho at 176, 335 P.3d at 21. “If users of the hospital’s services commonly
go from one location to the place where the hospital is located, then that location falls within the
geographical area which constitutes the community.” Id. The Court continued, “As we implicitly
recognized in Ramos, it is because people residing at one location may commonly use the
services provided by more than one hospital, communities may overlap one another.” Id. (citing
Ramos, 144 Idaho at 35, 156 P.3d at 536.) Here, the District Court incorrectly ruled that
individuals from Pocatello do not commonly go to Idaho Falls for medical care.
The District Court improperly focused on the ratio of patients/residents going from
Pocatello to Idaho Falls because the crucial issue was whether Pocatello residents ordinarily go
to Idaho Falls. If they did, then the communities overlap. Regular, consistent, and ordinary
use3—irrespective of volume, ratios, and percentages—is the key factor in this decision.
EIRMC produced Zip Code information about its patient base during discovery. (Am.
Supp. R., pp. 73-87.) The records indicate that EIRMC and its facilities treated ~1000 Pocatello
3

The statute uses language is “ordinarily served”. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1012 (2017).
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residents in 2015 and ~1100 Pocatello residents in 2016. (Id.) 2015 and 2016 were comparable
and indicate a customary, usual, or regular frequency of use. (12/21/17 Hr’g Tr. 74:17-75:1.) The
statute does not require exclusivity nor does it require a majority of a city’s residents use a
hospital. The statute only requires that a hospital ordinarily serve a geographic area. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 6-1012 (2017). For purposes of the Medical Defendants’ motions the information should
have been construed in the Phillipses’ favor. See Bybee, 157 Idaho at 177, 335 P.3d at 22 n.4.
The Phillipses first presented the issue of overlapping communities in a motion for partial
summary judgment. The District Court could have construed the evidence in a light favorable to
Medical Defendants solely for purposes of that motion. However, any adverse construal only lent
itself to a denial of the Phillipses’ motion. The Medical Defendants’ motions raised the issue of
Dr. Moss’s foundation. The Phillipses should have received the benefit of inferences for those
motions; instead, the District Court improperly weighed the evidence. See id. It incorrectly
decided the issue based on the percentage of patients seen at EIRMC as opposed to the regular,
frequent, and ordinary use by Pocatello residents. The District Court also ignored Dr. Moss’s
testimony that the communities were part of the same or similar communities. (R., p. 1221.) The
District Court should have considered his opinion as well in deciding the issue.
The District Court erred when it ruled that Dr. Erwin had a “temporal defect” in her
ability to familiarize Dr. Moss. Dr. Erwin started working at PMC in January 2016, less than a
month after Scott went to BHC. To consult about the December 2015 standard, she asked her
facility director, Dr. Ravsten, to confirm that the standard of practice at PMC’s inpatient facility
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did not differ between the two months. (R., pp. 1614-15, Dep. 50:11-51:6; 71:13-74:4.) She was
deposed on October 24, 2017, more than a year and a half after starting at PMC’s facility. (Id.)
In Samples, the plaintiff’s expert did not consult with a local practitioner. Samples, 161
Idaho at 185, 384 P.3d at 949. The plaintiff’s expert actually practiced in the community at issue
and so the Court reasoned “it would certainly seem a matter of common sense that Dr.
Birkenhagen would have had ample opportunity to become familiar with the previous standard
of care for general surgery at BMH.” Id. The same is true for Dr. Erwin. Though she did not
practice in Pocatello in December 2015, it is a matter of common sense that she would have
become familiar with the standard in Pocatello over the course of her employment. It is also a
matter of common sense that she would know what the standard of practice was in Pocatello for
2015 because she confirmed the standard with her facility director who was there in 2015. (R.,
pp. 1614-15, Dep. 50:11-51:6; 71:13-74:4.) Thus, the District Court erred with this ruling.
It should not matter that Dr. Erwin had to confirm the standard of practice in December
2015 with Dr. Ravsten. Both are psychiatrists who practiced at the same facility. Both are part of
the same specialty as Dr. Larsen. There is no reason why her confirming the standards with
another psychiatrist creates any sort of foundational problems given her innate knowledge of
psychiatric standards and that all she did was confirm with Dr. Ravsten that the standards did not
change between December 2015 and January 2016. The argument is not that Dr. Ravsten
familiarized her with the standard in Idaho Falls but confirmed the standard in Pocatello was the
same in December 2015 and January 2016. Thus, the District Court should be reversed.
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e. EIRMC Standard of Care
In discovery, EIRMC provided the Phillipses with a document setting forth its Standard
of Care at BHC. The District Court construed the document as “more consistent with goals
EIRMC and the others seek to attain in their treatment of patients.” (Id., pp. 2494-95.) This
ignores the essence of standards of healthcare practice—they are goals sought to be achieved by
practitioners and facilities. Dr. Moss relied on the document among other things.
Standards of healthcare need not be complex. EIRMC’s statement in the document is an
admission by EIRMC of the standard applicable to the conduct of its healthcare professionals
and itself. It is specific to Scott because it came from Scott’s EIRMC medical record. (Id., p.
1695.) Dr. Denny and Dr. Larsen substantively agreed with the Standard of Care and testified it
was accurate, with one minor change, and that it applied to them. (Id., pp. 1527-28, Dep. 39:2443:4; p. 1580, Dep. 218:7-220:21.)4 Dr. Larsen conceded the document accurately identified the
standard while Scott was at the facility. (Id., p. 1580, Dep. 218:7-220:21.) Thus, the District
Court erred when it parsed Dr. Moss’s disclosure with respect to his testimony about the EIRMC
and psychiatric standards of practice. The standards were coextensive during December 2015.
f. Dr. Moss’s opinions about Scott’s intoxication at discharge
The District Court ruled that Dr. Moss could not testify that Scott was intoxicated when
he left BHC. This ruling misapplied Rule 702 and the case law.

4

The disclosure itself is to be viewed as a whole and Dr. Moss’s opinions as to EIRMC’s

negligence were clearly disclosed and based on information he reviewed.
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“The test for determining whether a witness is qualified as an expert is ‘not rigid’ and can
be found in Idaho Rules of Evidence 702.” Weeks v. E. Idaho Health Servs., 143 Idaho 834, 837,
153 P.3d 1180, 1183 (2007) (citation omitted). Formal training is not required. Id. The “question
under the evidence rule is simply whether the expert’s knowledge will assist the trier of fact; not
whether the information upon which the expert’s opinion is based is commonly agreed upon.”
Id., at 838, 153 P.3d at 1184. “The focus of the court’s inquiry is on the ‘principles and
methodology’ used not the conclusions they generate.” Id.
Here, Dr. Moss brought over thirty years of experience treating patients with addictive
behaviors. (R., pp. 1220-38.) His opinions were based on his experience, training, and skill. (Id.)
He does not need to be a toxicologist to testify as to Scott’s intoxication if the records provide
him with a basis for his opinion. Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837, 153 P.3d at 1183. Dr. Moss was
familiar with rates of alcohol dissipation and could render his opinion accordingly. (R., p. 1232,
¶ 37.) The rate was known to Dr. Moss as a psychiatrist with extensive experience treating
addictions. (Id.) He had specific experience treating alcoholism (Id., pp. 1248-49.) Consequently,
Dr. Moss was qualified to opine that Scott was intoxicated when he left BHC.
B. The District Court erred when it granted the motions for summary judgment.
1. Standard of Review
Summary judgment is reviewed de novo. See Samples, 161 Idaho at 181-82, 384 P.3d at
945-46. The Court uses the same standard used by the district court when making its ruling. Id.
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2. Argument
The District Court dismissed the claims against the Medical Defendants based on its
decision to exclude and strike Dr. Moss. (R., pp. 2438-74.) To the extent the District Court erred
in doing so, summary judgment should be reversed because Dr. Moss testified as to negligence
and causation. (Id., pp. 1220-312.) This Court should reverse the District Court and reinstate the
case based on the arguments and authority cited in Section III.A, supra.
In addition to dismissing the case based on its rulings with respect to Dr. Moss, the
District Court “out of an abundance of caution” addressed other issues raised by the Medical
Defendants. (R., p. 2446.) These additional rulings are addressed, infra, and should be reversed.
a. The Leaving Hospital Against Medical Advice (AMA) form
Prior to leaving BHC, Scott allegedly signed a BHC form entitled Leaving Hospital
Against Medical Advice. (R., pp. 626-27.) The form purports to have Scott release the physician
and hospital from “any and all responsibility for any ill effects resulting” from his discharge
against medical advice. (Id.) The District Court erroneously ruled that the form bound the
Phillipses, barring their claims. (Id., pp. 2438-74.) The Court should reverse.
In granting summary judgment based on the AMA form, the District Court’s entire legal
authority and analysis was as follows: “In Bevan v. Vassar Farms, Inc., the Idaho Supreme Court
pronounced if a defendant could not have been liable to the decedent, then neither can the
defendant be held liable to the heirs of the decedent.” (Id., p. 2448.) (citing Bevan v. Vassar
Farms, Inc., 117 Idaho 1038, 1041, 793 P.2d 711, 714 (1990)). The District Court’s analysis
oversimplified the issue and failed to consider other law that was far more applicable than Bevan.
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The linchpin principle undergirding all wrongful death actions in Idaho is this: the
defendant must have committed a wrongful act or neglect against the decedent. See IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 5-311 (2017); Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 Idaho 609, 617, 238 P.3d 209, 217 (2010);
Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 540-41, 148 P.2d 221, 223 (1944). The wrongful act vis-à-vis the
decedent creates a new cause of action for the decedent’s heirs to assert. This principle is simple,
but it is the one crucial element that makes sense of the range of results in the case law.
The District Court’s reliance on Bevan is misplaced. Bevan does not involve a release
akin to the AMA form. Bevan involved the application of contributory negligence to a wrongful
death claim. Bevan, 117 Idaho at 1039, 793 P.2d at 712. Yet, in this case no jury has decided the
Medical Defendants’ liability to Scott for his injuries had he lived. The Medical Defendants’
liability remained an open question unlike Bevan. This case did not involve contributory
negligence; the issue related to the effectiveness of a purported release of claims. The form does
not have the legal effect of transmuting an otherwise wrongful act into a rightful one. At best, the
form constitutes a waiver of Scott’s individual right to recover for a wrongful act—functioning
like an affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations, for example.
The Bevan court noted the well-established precedent in Idaho law that “[i]f the
decedent’s negligence would have barred his recovery against the defendant for injuries had he
survived, then the decedent’s heirs are barred from recovery in a wrongful death action.” Id., at
1039-40, 793 P.2d at 712-13 (internal citations omitted). The decedent’s parents argued that
since they had not been negligent, the decedent’s negligence should not bar them from recovery.
Id., at 1040-41, 793 P.2d at 713-14. The Court rejected this argument and clarified that because
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the jury found that the decedent 50% negligent, the defendant committed no wrongful act or
neglect against the deceased. Id., at 1041, 793 P.2d at 714. The court reasoned:
It necessarily follows based on the well established law in this jurisdiction that
if a defendant is not liable for injuries to the decedent had death not ensued,
then there is no basis for recovery by the decedent’s heirs. If a defendant’s
conduct does not make him liable to an injured party, then that defendant
cannot be held liable in the event of death for damages resulting from the
same conduct. Thus there is no basis for recovery of damages by the heirs of
the decedent in this case because fifty percent of the negligence was
apportioned to him.
Id. (emphasis added). The District Court cited this portion of Bevan in its decision. (R., p. 2448.)
Yet, the Bevan court simply stated the linchpin principle that the defendant must have committed
a wrongful act against the decedent for the plaintiffs to recover. In Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho
244, 985 P.2d 669 (1999), the Court restricted the scope of this principle as stated in Bevan.
[W]hen the negligence of another causes a person’s death, the decedent’s heirs
or personal representative may maintain an action for damages against the
wrongdoer. However, an heir may only recover for wrongful death if the
decedent would have been able to recover. See, e.g., Bevan v. Vassar Farms,
Inc., 117 Idaho 1038, 1041, 793 P.2d 711, 714 (1990). Thus, the heir must
prove that the wrongful act or negligence of the defendant caused the
injury and resulting death.
Id., at 247, 985 P.2d at 672 (emphasis added). The Turpen court qualified Bevan, clarifying that
Idaho’s wrongful death statute requires a defendant’s wrongful act or negligence cause the death.
In Castorena v. General Electric, 149 Idaho 609, 238 P.3d 209 (2010), the Court
analyzed the scope of the linchpin principle. Castorena is about the statute of limitations for
filing a wrongful death action. The Castorena court determined that although the decedent would
have been barred from bringing a claim by the statute of limitations, the decedent’s heirs had a
separate claim running from the date of death. Id., at 620, 238 P.3d at 220. This illustrates an
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important boundary on Bevan. The question is not whether the decedent could have successfully
prosecuted a lawsuit against the defendant, but whether the defendant committed a wrongful or
negligent act that supported a claim. The Castorena court explained that the statute created an
action based on the same wrongful conduct. Id., at 619, 238 P.3d at 219 (citation omitted).
As discussed, supra, the Bevan court found that the decedent’s contributory negligence
barred recovery by the decedent’s heirs. Bevan, 117 Idaho at 1040, 793 P.2d at 713. The
decedent’s own negligence, as determined by the jury, determined that the defendant was not, in
fact, negligent. In Sprouse v. Magee, 46 Idaho 622, 269 P. 993 (1928), the decedent’s heirs could
not recover for wrongful death because the decedent’s husband was found contributorily
negligent. Id., 46 Idaho at 625-26, 269 P. at 994. As in Bevan, this meant the defendant had
committed no wrongful act, so the heirs could not recover. Id., at 626, 269 P. at 994.
In Russell v. Cox, 65 Idaho 534, 148 P.2d 221 (1944) (superseded on other grounds), the
decedent’s husband shot her to death with a firearm. The husband asserted the common law
defense that a tort committed by one spouse against another does not give rise to a cause of
action. Id., at 537, 148 P.2d at 222. The Court determined that the decedent’s mother could sue
the husband for wrongful death notwithstanding the decedent’s lack of standing to have brought
a claim, had she survived. Id. at 539, 148 P.2d at 224. As the court noted in Castorena, “Thus, in
Russell, when this Court was asked to consider a defense related to the decedent’s personal
standing to bring a claim, rather than to the wrongful nature of the injury itself, this Court found
that the condition precedent did not apply.” Castorena, 149 Idaho at 618, 238 P.3d at 218.
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Perhaps most relevant to the application of the linchpin principle to this case are the two
railroad cases, Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Adams, 192 U.S. 440, 24 S.Ct. 408, 48 L.Ed. 513
(1904) and Earley v. Pacific Electric Railway Co., 176 Cal. 79, 167 P. 513 (Cal. 1914). Adams is
an Idaho case that came before the U.S. Supreme Court, and Earley is a California case cited
extensively with approval by the Idaho Supreme Court in Russell v. Cox and Castorena. In
Adams, the decedent signed a waiver of liability to the railroad in exchange for a free ticket. 192
U.S. at 441, 24 S.Ct. at 408, 48 L.Ed. at 514. The passenger fell from the train and died, and his
heirs sued the railroad for wrongful death. Id. The Supreme Court found that the decedent’s
waiver barred his heirs from recovery against the defendant railroad. Id., at 449, 24 S.Ct. at 408,
48 L.Ed. at 516. In Earley, the decedent also signed a release to the railroad, but this time after
being injured as a train passenger. 176 Cal. at 80, 167 P. at 513. The decedent eventually died
from his injuries, and his wife sued the railroad for wrongful death. Id. In this case, the court
allowed the wife to claim damages for her husband’s wrongful death, despite an unambiguous
contract, signed by the decedent prior to his death, releasing the railroad “from any and all claims
and causes of action on account of any and all personal injuries” he suffered. Id.
The critical distinction between the two railroad cases is the linchpin principle. In Adams,
the decedent proactively released the defendant of any liability for his welfare. As a result, the
railroad owed no duty to the decedent and therefore never committed a negligent act against the
decedent. As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, “[i]f there be no omission of duty to the decedent,
his heirs have no claim.” Adams, 192 U.S. at 449, 24 S.Ct. at 408, 48 L.Ed. at 516. The Idaho
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Supreme Court clarified the waiver “eliminated the railway company’s duty, as to negligence,
toward the travelling attorney in [Adams].” Castorena, 149 Idaho at 616, 238 P.3d at 216.
Conversely, in Earley, the decedent signed his release after the defendant had already
committed a negligent act against him. Earley, 176 Cal. at 80, 167 P. at 513. The Earley
decedent signed away his right of action against the defendant, but that did not change the fact
that the defendant had committed a negligent act against the decedent. As a result, the decedent’s
heirs could take up their own, separate claim based on the same negligent act against the
decedent. Id., at 81, 167 P. at 513-14. In Adams, the decedent’s waiver released the railroad’s
liability before the railroad acted, so the railroad made no wrongful or negligent act; in Earley,
the decedent released his right of action against the railroad for the negligent act the railroad had
already committed, so the decedent’s heirs could pursue their claim for wrongful death.
There are two types of release contracts: (1) a release of liability for future negligence,
and (2) a release of claims for past negligence. The first type is best illustrated by the waiver
signed as a condition of participating in an inherently dangerous activity, such as horseback
riding or rock climbing. See, e.g., Lee v. Sun Valley Co., 107 Idaho 976, 695 P.2d 361 (1984);
Morrison v. Nw. Nazarene Univ., 152 Idaho 660, 273 P.3d 1253 (2012). The waiver the decedent
signed in Adams is an example of this first type of release contract. The second type is a common
trapping of loans, settlements, and other contracts, in which a party abandons a cause of action.
See Robert Comstock, LLC v. Keybank Nat. Ass’n, 142 Idaho 568, 571-72, 130 P.3d 1106, 110910 (2006). The release the decedent signed in Earley is of this second type of release contract.
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The AMA form is not like the one in Adams. The only action for which the AMA form
claims to release the Medical Defendants from liability is the decedent’s departure from the
hospital. (R., pp. 626-27.) The claims against which the AMA form is raised as a defense
include, inter alia, admitting Scott to EIRMC voluntarily and failing to place Scott on an
involuntary legal hold. The Phillipses claim that these acts constitute breaches of the applicable
standard of healthcare practice and that they caused Scott’s wrongful death. These are negligent
acts that the Medical Defendants committed against the decedent prior to the time Scott allegedly
signed the AMA form. Even assuming that the AMA form is an effective proactive waiver of the
Medical Defendants’ liability, signed before they allowed Scott to leave BHC, it entirely fails to
account for the prior wrongful acts by the Medical Defendants against the decedent, which the
Phillipses assert caused Scott’s wrongful death. If the AMA form is the first type of release, then
the form fails to release the Medical Defendants from liability for their negligence.
If the AMA form is the second type of release contract, designed to release any claims
against the defendants for any wrongful or negligent acts committed prior to the alleged signing
of the form, then the AMA form will have the same effect as the release the decedent signed in
Earley. Such a release would not change the character of the Medical Defendants’ harmful and
negligent acts; rather, the release is merely a release of Scott’s claim against the Medical
Defendants. Just as in Earley, Russell v. Cox, and Castorena, Scott’s heirs have a separate,
independent claim arising from the same wrongful or negligent acts against Scott. See Chapman
v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 105 Idaho 785, 787, 673 P.2d 385, 387 (1983).
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The Medical Defendants cited Ingutti v. Rochester General Hospital, 114 A.D.3d 1302,
980 N.Y.S.2d 692 (2014), before the District Court for the proposition that the AMA form
absolves them from liability. Their reliance on Ingutti is misplaced and it does not apply. Unlike
Ingutti, Idaho Code § 66-326 is a statute that permits hospitals and its staff to involuntarily hold
patients. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 66-326 (2017). There did not appear to be a comparable statute
available in Ingutti and Ingutti was not a wrongful death case and the form’s application to a
wrongful death claim was not decided. Ingutti, 114 A.D.3d at 1303. Regardless, New York’s
wrongful death statute is a “survival statute” and not of the “death act” variety like Idaho’s. See
Spangler v. McQuitty, 449 Md. 33, 61, 141 A.3d 156, 173 (2016) (citing Doe v. State, 189
A.D.2d 199, 206-07, 595 N.Y.S.2d 592 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)). Ingutti offers no useful insight
into how the EIRMC AMA form applies under Idaho’s wrongful death statute.
A release by Scott does not bar recovery by Scott’s heirs because Scott could only ever
release his own claims. See Russell, 65 Idaho at 539, 148 P.2d at 223 (“[T]he right of action,
which accrues on the death of the injured party, can only be prosecuted by her ‘heirs or personal
representatives’ and does not benefit the estate.”) (emphasis in original). Since the heirs’ “cause
of action does not come into existence until the death,” it did not exist when Scott signed. See
Castorena, 149 Idaho at 619, 238 P.3d at 219 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899
cmt. c (1979)). Whether the Court regards the AMA form as a release of future liability, a release
of claims for past negligence, or some combination of the two, the AMA form is not effective to
bar the Phillipses’ claims. The District Court erred by binding the Phillipses to the AMA form.
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The Phillipses also assert that the District Court erred by finding that the AMA form
applied to both Dr. Larsen and IBHS. The Court based its decision to reject the Plaintiffs’
argument on this issue on the facts that (1) the AMA form states that the signor releases the
attending physician, and (2) Dr. Larsen was Scott’s attending physician. (R., pp. 2450-51.)
However, Dr. Larsen is not a party to the AMA form. Release of one tortfeasor does not
discharge other tortfeasors from liability unless expressly stated. Esterbrook v. State, 124 Idaho
680, 683, 863 P.2d 349, 352 (1992). If EIRMC’s arguments that Dr. Larsen was not its agent
remain valid, then the AMA form, regardless of its verbiage, could not release a non-agent.
The Court should also rule that the AMA form violates public policy for purposes of
wrongful death plaintiffs. Applying such a release to wrongful death claimants impermissibly
shifts the burden of compensation from the wrongdoers to charities, families, and, potentially,
the state. New Jersey, which is among the minority of states joining Idaho in its treatment of
releases and wrongful death statutes, see Spangler v. McQuitty, 449 Md. 33, 61-62, 141 A.3d
156, 173 (2016) (citing both Castorena and Gershon with approval), found that such releases are
void for public policy with respect to wrongful death claims. In Gershon, Adm’x Ad
Prosequendum for Estate of Pietroluongo v. Regency Diving Ctr., Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 237, 845
A.2d 720 (App. Div. 2004), the New Jersey Superior Court explained how enforcing a release
against a decedent’s heirs adversely affects the public interest because it shifts the economic
burden of compensating the heirs to public welfare agencies, family members, and charities. Id.
at 249, 845 A.2d at 727-28. It deprives the beneficiaries of a Wrongful Death Act from pursuing
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remedies against a wrongdoer and it immunizes entities, such as EIRMC, by allowing them to
operate without risk of litigation. Id. The adverse consequences identified above apply here.
Enforcing the AMA violates basic contract principles in that the hospital offers no
consideration for the patient’s release. In Dedely by Dedely v. Kings Highway Hosp. Ctr., Inc.,
126 Misc. 2d 444, 447, 617 N.Y.S.2d 445, 447 (Sup. Ct. 1994), the New York court considered
the effect of a “RELEASE FOR LEAVING HOSPITAL AGAINST ADVICE” signed by a
minor’s mother. Noting that the hospital would be subject to a tort if the hospital refused to
release a patient, the court concluded that the hospital could not, “as a condition to doing what it
is obliged to do, extract a promise to save it from its own wrongdoing.” Id.
Finally, there were issues of fact whether Scott was competent at the time he signed the
AMA form. Scott suffered from bipolar disorder and had been off his medications for two
weeks. (R., p. 1578, Dep. 207:1-21.) There is no dispute that bipolar disorder can cause
incompetence. (Id., p. 1588, Dep. 257:10-258:4.) Scott’s mental condition had gone, essentially,
untreated at EIRMC when he left less than eight hours after arriving. A release is efficacious
only if the person signing it is competent. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 29-101 (2017) (“All persons
are capable of contracting, except minors, persons of unsound mind, and persons deprived of
civil rights”). “Whether a contracting party has sufficient mental capacity to enter into a valid
contract is a question of fact to be determined by the trier of the facts as of the time of the
transaction.” Miller v. Miller, 88 Idaho 57, 63, 396 P.2d 476, 480 (1964).
Here, there was evidence that Scott suffered from bipolar, was off his medications, and
had expressed suicidal ideation, with a specific plan and lethal means, less than eight hours prior
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to leaving BHC. He had been drinking the night before.5 Dr. Moss testified that given the totality
of Scott’s condition, Scott was incompetent to make a decision about leaving BHC. (R., p. 1232,
¶ 37.) This is not an opinion that falls within Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 or 6-1013 since it is a
medical opinion based on the medical record and Dr. Moss’s experience, skill, and knowledge as
a physician. Under Weeks and Rule 702, Dr. Moss was qualified to testify about Scott’s
competence. Weeks, 143 Idaho at 837, 153 P.3d at 1183. The District Court erred.
There were also issues of fact whether Scott signed the AMA form. The validity of a
signature is an issue of fact. See, e.g., Martinez v. Moroldo, 160 A.D.2d 387, 389, 553 N.Y.S.2d
751, 753 (1990) (validity of a signature is question of fact).
In June 2016, Penny requested a complete copy of Scott’s EIRMC records. (R., pp. 131379.) EIRMC provided her with a document set. (Id.) The document set did not contain the AMA
form. (Id.) EIRMC produced the AMA form in discovery in response to the Phillipses request.
The inconsistent document production raises serious questions about the AMA form’s
source and origination. How the document came to be is at minimum a jury question. Penny also
denies that Scott signed the AMA form. (Id., pp. 1502-18.) EIRMC’s counsel started arguing
with Penny about the claim during the deposition. (Id.) She did not relent. Penny has maintained
that she does not believe Scott signed the AMA form because she did not receive copies of the

5

Dr. Moss opined that more probable than not Scott still had alcohol in his system when he left

BHC. (R., p. 1232-33.) The admissibility of that opinion, and the error committed by the District
Court is addressed in Section III.A.2.f, supra, incorporated by reference.
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form in 2016. (Id.) Penny’s position is reasonable and on summary judgment the District Court
should have construed the evidence in the Phillipses’ favor. Penny also denied that the
handwriting is Scott’s and she does not believe that he signed the AMA form. (Id.)
b. Vicarious liability of EIRMC for Dr. Larsen’s conduct
The District Court erred when it found that EIRMC was not vicariously liable for Dr.
Larsen’s conduct. There was ample evidence establishing that EIRMC held Dr. Larsen out as its
agent and that a reasonable person would believe Dr. Larsen acted under EIRMC’s authority.
A hospital may be found vicariously liable under Idaho’s doctrine of apparent authority
for the negligence of a physician even though the physician is ostensibly only an independent
contractor. See Jones v. HealthSouth Treasure Valley Hosp., 147 Idaho 109, 113-14, 206 P.3d
473, 477-78 (2009). The two elements of apparent authority are (1) conduct by the principal
“holding out” that person as its agent and (2) acceptance of the agent’s service by one who
reasonably believes it is rendered on the principal’s behalf. Id., at 116, 206 P.3d at 480. A
principal can manifest assent to an contractor’s action “by placing the person in a position from
which third parties will infer that the principal assents to acts necessary to fulfill the
responsibilities of that position.” Estate of Cordero v. Christ Hosp., 403 N.J.Super. 306, 316, 958
A.2d 101, 106-07 (Ct.App.Div.2008). The existence of admissions documents or
corporate/organizational contracts is not dispositive. See Hammer v. Barth, 2016 IL App (1st)
143066, ¶ 23, 48 N.E.3d 769, 776-77, appeal denied, 50 N.E.3d 1139 (Ill. 2016). “There
certainly could be situations in which a patient signs a consent form containing such a disclaimer
but additional facts exist that would create a triable issue of fact as to whether the hospital held
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the defendant physician out as its agent.” Id., at ¶ 23, 48 N.E.3d at 777 (citing Churkey v. Rustia,
329 Ill.App.3d 239, 244-45, 263 Ill.Dec. 761, 768 N.E.2d 842 (2002)). The Jones court also
quoted Williams v. St. Claire Medical Center, 657 S.W.2d 590 (Ky.Ct.App. 1983) for the
proposition that liability for hospitals extends to “independent staff personnel” under the proper
circumstances. Id. This is such a circumstance and the District Court should be reversed.
The District Court considered the evidence before it and ruled that EIRMC “conducted
itself in a manner that would have reasonably lead Scott Phillips to believe Dr. Larsen (and
others) was acting on its behalf.” (R., p. 2452.) This should have ended the analysis for purposes
of vicarious liability under Jones but the District Court engaged in further analysis to justify its
decision. The evidence before the District Court generated triable issues in the Phillipses’ favor.
The evidence included documents given to Scott with EIRMC’s name and logo, Dr. Larsen’s
office being located at BHC, Dr. Larsen’s obligation to provide care to BHC patients even if they
were not his own, the fact that he had to accept committee assignments, Dr. Larsen’s acceptance
of call, and he was subject to the corporate bylaws and policies. (Id., p. 1574, Dep., 185:1-14; pp.
1697-720; 1744-46.) Dr. Larsen also had a BHC ID badge. (Id., p. 611, Dep. 153:3.) Scott also
did not choose Dr. Larsen or any of the individual healthcare professionals he saw on December
8, 2015—they were assigned to him, including Dr. Larsen. EIRMC controlled physician
assignments and arguably “held out” the physicians as EIRMC agents. When Scott left BHC he
allegedly signed the AMA form purporting to release Dr. Larsen in addition to BHC. (R., pp.
626-27.) The District Court should have allowed a jury to sort out this issue. See, e.g., Adkison
Corp. v. Am. Bldg. Co., 107 Idaho 406, 409, 690 P.2d 341, 344 (1984). The only way the
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document could bind Dr. Larsen is if he were an agent—something the District Court did not
find. The Court should reverse.
It is similarly a reasonable inference that a reasonable individual would believe that Dr.
Larsen acted on EIRMC’s behalf. “When a hospital provides a doctor for a patient under
circumstances in which a reasonable patient would believe the service is rendered in behalf of
the hospital, a strong inference arises that a patient who accepts the doctor’s care does so in that
reasonable belief.” Cordero, supra, at 318, 958 A.2d at 108 (citation omitted). Scott accepted the
treatment from Dr. Larsen creating an issue of fact. Thus, the District Court erred.
c. IBHS
The District Court also dismissed IBHS, Dr. Larsen’s employer. To the extent the Court
reverses the District Court with respect to its decision to exclude and strike Dr. Moss the Court
should reverse the District Court’s dismissal of IBHS on the basis that the Phillipses did not meet
Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 & 1013’s requirements.
The District Court also relied on its analysis concerning the AMA form to dismiss IBHS.
To the extent the Court reverses the District Court as to the AMA form, the Court should reverse
and vacate the District Court’s decision on those grounds.
C. The District Court erred when it allowed the local consultants’ depositions.
1. Standard of Review
A district court’s rulings on discovery matters are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
See Selkirk Seed Co. v. Forney, 134 Idaho 98, 104, 996 P.2d 798, 804 (2000).
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2. Argument
The District Court abused its discretion when it allowed the depositions of Drs.
Kishiyama and Erwin, two local consulting physicians retained by the Phillipses to provide
information to their testifying expert, Dr. Moss. (Id., pp. 461-65; 09/21/17 Hr’g Tr. 21:1-44:19.)
The Phillipses retained both physicians as experts to assist in preparation for trial, but they were
not expected to be called to testify. As such, they fall squarely within the scope of Rule
26(b)(4)(D). IDAHO R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(D) (2017). Thus, the District Court should not have
allowed the depositions absent the required showings set forth in Rule 26(b)(4)(D)(i-ii).
In Quigley v. Kemp, 162 Idaho 408, 398 P.3d 141 (2017), the Court answered a single
question: was a consulting physician’s identity shielded under Rule 26(b)(4)(B)? The Court only
decided that the rule did not shield a local consultant’s identity from disclosure if “subject to a
properly formulated discovery request.” Id., 162 Idaho at 145, 398 P.3d at 412. The Quigley
court did not decide that a local consultant could be deposed or whether Rule 26(b)(4)(B)
shielded the consultant from a deposition. Nothing in Idaho Code §§ 6-1012 & 1013 or Rule 26
allows for the deposition of a non-testifying, retained expert absent exceptional circumstances.
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(i) only requires that a retained, testifying expert disclose the full basis
of opinions. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i) (2017). A Rule 26 disclosure for the testifying
expert, which includes the name of a local consultant, achieves that goal. In medical malpractice
cases, the expert only needs to explain how he became familiar with the applicable standard of
healthcare practice. Bybee, 157 Idaho at 174, 335 P.3d at 19 (citation omitted). Thus, an expert
must only disclose a local consultant’s identity and state facts that “would likely give rise to
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knowledge of [the] standard” while “employing a measure of common sense.” Mattox v. Life
Care Ctrs. of Am., 157 Idaho at 474, 337 P.3d at 633. Allowing depositions of local consultants
is simply not required for the expert to satisfy Rule 26’s disclosure requirements or to satisfy the
evidentiary showings under §§ 6-1012 & 1013.
The Court should not allow local consultant depositions absent an exceptional showing
consistent with Rule 26(b)(4)(D). Courts only evaluate facts set forth by the testifying expert for
purposes of evaluating the proferred testimony’s § 6-1013. Id. Courts historically have not
required testimony from consultants to gauge whether the expert has articulated enough of a
basis to reasonably give rise to knowledge of the applicable standards. Id. At trial, courts will
rule on the admissibility of testimony based solely on what a witness says constitutes the
foundation for the opinions. Thus, allowing depositions of consultants is unnecessary.
Allowing the depositions also has a chilling effect. Local practitioners were reluctant to
get involved in lawsuits even before Quigley. It does not take too much imagination to realize
that allowing defendants to depose local consultants further chills participation by the local
consultants and will only serve to immunize healthcare providers from responsibility.
Defendants should only be allowed to depose local consultants under exceptional
circumstances. Rule 26(b)(4)(D)(ii) exists for this purpose. IDAHO R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4)(D)(ii)
(2017). Given the Court’s long-standing legal touchstones for admissibility set forth in cases like
Dulaney v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 137 Idaho 160, 45 P.3d 816 (2002), and
clarified in cases like Samples, 161 Idaho 179, 384 P.3d 943 (2016), depositions should rarely, if
ever, be allowed. Plaintiffs have obligations under Rule 26(b)(4) to fully disclose the basis for an
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expert’s opinions, including the substance of conversations with consultants. The Rule
26(b)(4)(A)(i) disclosures makes depositions cumulative and invades work product.
D. The District Court erred in granting the Medical Defendants’ Motion for a
Protective Order concerning the scope of EIRMC’s 30(b)(6) deposition.
1. Standard of Review
“Control of discovery is an area within the discretion of the trial court. Therefore, the
proper standard for reviewing a trial court’s grant of a protective order is abuse of discretion.”
Quigley, 162 Idaho at 410, 398 P.3d at 143 (citation omitted).
2. Argument
The District Court incorrectly held that EIRMC was not required to designate a corporate
representative to testify concerning the standard of healthcare practice in December 2015 for its
psychiatrists. The Phillipses sought to depose EIRMC pursuant to Rule 30(b)(6) on many topics
including Topic 9, the standard of care for psychiatrists in Idaho Falls during 2015. (R., pp. 26629.) The District Court granted EIRMC’s Motion for Protective Order with respect to Topic 9.
(08/24/17 Hr’g Tr. 18:13-20:12.) The Court ruled that § 6-1013 required expert testimony about
the standard of practice and a 30(b)(6) designation was improper. (Id.)
The Court abused its discretion because it misapplied applicable law and conflated the
standards for discovery of evidence and admissibility of evidence. Expert testimony regarding
“breach of the standard of care” includes both facts and opinions. The standard of healthcare
practice is a fact; whether the standard of care was breached is an opinion subject to expert
testimony per Idaho Code § 6-1012. The statute never limits discovery of what constitutes the
applicable standard just to expert discovery. Indeed, this Court has noted that standards of care
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are not “static and firmly rooted in past medical practices.” Mattox, 157 Idaho at 474, 337 P.3d at
633. They are “sensitive to evolving changes in the way health care services are delivered in the
various communities in our State.” Id. The Court has recognized several methods for becoming
familiar with standards of practice. See, e.g., Dulaney, 137 Idaho at 164, 45 P.3d at 820
(inquiring of local specialist); Suhadolnik, 151 Idaho 110, 117, 254 P.3d 11, 18 (2011) (review of
defendant’s deposition); Samples, 161 Idaho at 182, 384 P.3d at 946 (board certified practitioners
are held to board certification standards); Mattox, 157 Idaho at 474, 337 P.3d at 633
(governmental regulation, development of regional and national provider organizations, and
greater access to flow of medical information). None of the foregoing “recognized” methods
require expert discovery and the District Court incorrectly imposed one.
Opinions about whether the Medical Defendants complied with any standards would
have been subjects of expert opinion. See, e.g., IDAHO R. EVID. 702 (2017); Foster v. Traul, 145
Idaho 24, 29, 175 P.3d 186, 191 (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1012 (2017). Such opinions are
different than the facts relied upon to formulate the opinions.
Discoverability and admissibility of evidence are different. In Perry v. Magic Valley
Regional Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 995 P.2d 816 (2000), the plaintiff took depositions of
the hospital’s nursing staff. Id., at 51-52, 995 P.2d at 821-22. They were not expert depositions
but were depositions of hospital staff who testified about standards of care. The plaintiff’s expert
reviewed the transcripts and relied on them for foundation. Id., at 52, 995 P.2d at 822. Facts were
discovered based on ordinary fact discovery and experts then offered opinions.
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It is illogical to suggest that the standard of healthcare practice is an opinion – if the
standard of healthcare practice is subject to varying “opinions” then it is, by definition, not a
standard. However, because the standard of care is a fact, any healthcare provider who has
practitioners in the specialty at issue (i) should know what the fact/standard is (ii) and should be
required to testify as to that fact/standard. The Phillipses sought discovery from EIRMC about
the standard of practice for psychiatrists at its facility, but were denied the chance to perform that
discovery. They were not allowed to explore the EIRMC Standard of Care (R., p. 1695) with any
EIRMC official. EIRMC also claimed that there were other factors, such as internal policies,
“that may bear on the standard of care.” (Id., p. 238.) The Plaintiffs should have been allowed to
explore the relationship between the internal policies and the standard of care with a corporate
representative, but were improperly denied that opportunity by the District Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
As a result of the foregoing, the Court should reverse the District Court and remand for
further proceedings.
DATED: January 11, 2019.

/s/ John M. Avondet
John M. Avondet
Of Beard St. Clair Gaffney PA
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Appellants
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